The Armada de Barlovento, fleet despatch and transport of Mercury to Mexico, 1637-1738 by Lang, M. F.
Revista de Indias, 1994, vol L!V, núm 202 
THE ARMADA DE BARLOVENTO, FLEET DESPATCH, ANO 
TRANSPORT OF MERCURY TO MEXICO 1637-1738 
POR 
M.F. LANG
Universidad de Salford. Gran Bretaña 
l. IMPORTANCE OF THE ARMADA DE BARLOVENTO
The importance of the Caribbean flotilla the Armada de Bar­
lovento in trade and transport links between Mexico and Spain 
in the second half of the XVIIth century is well documented. 
José de Veitia Linaje discusses its role in an important section of 
his treatise Norte de la Contratación de Indias ( 1 ). The valuable 
study of the Armada de Barlovento by Bibiano Torres Ramíerez 
dwells on its deployment, its excursions against piracy, and the 
problems of its administration and crewing (2). In the present 
article the intention is rather to trace the close connection be­
tween the deployment of this flotilla, the general fleet system, 
and above ali the critica! problem of keeping the Mexican silver 
mines adequately supplied with mercury from Almadén in Spain, 
a supply which was essential since without mercury the silver 
could not be refined, there being no supply from within that 
viceroyalty - unlike Peru which could depend on a local supply 
from Huancavelica. lt should be emphasised here that its was 
precicely the study of the supply of mercury which repeatedly 
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( 1) José VEITIA LINAJE, Norte de la. Contratación de las Indias, Estudio preliminar
y edición de Francisco de SOLANO, Madrid, Ministerio de Hacienda, 1981, libro II. 
cap. v. 
(2) Bibiano TORRES RAMÍREZ, La Armada de &rlovento, Sevilla, Escuela de
Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1981. Strangely Haring doesn't deal with Barlovento 
in his study of colonial trade, C. HARING, Comercio y navegación entre España y
las Indias, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura 1979. There are frequent reference to 
Barlovento in L. GARCÍA FUENTES, El comercio español con América 1650-1700, 
Sevilla 1980. 
Revista de Indias, vol. 54, nº 202 (1994)
(c) Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas. 
Licencia Creative Commons Reconocimiento 4.0  
Internacional (CC BY 4.0)
http://revistadeindias.revistas.csic.es
576 M.F. LANG
raised for the present author the question of the utilisation of 
the Armada de Barlovento. 
1.1. Antecedents and Foundation 
The origins of this flotilla, which caused so much concem to 
the viceroys, as reflected in their Memorias, are said to go back 
to 1514 when a squadron under Juan Ponce de León was sent 
against the corsairs already active in the Caribbean. In 1578 
there is mention of a similar squadron, and subsequently ad hoc 
flotillas were f ormed in the same manner to ele ar the coasts of 
Mexico and -the Caribbean of piracy and foreign intruders. The 
components of these flotillas were normally available vessels of 
the Carrera de Indias which spent the winter in Veracruz awaiting 
the annual spring retum to Spain with the treasure. 
In 1636 an attempt was made to institutionalise for the first 
time the def ense of the Caribbean by creating a permanent 
flotilla under the title of Armada de Barlovento, responding to 
the reality of the subsequent permanency of piracy and what 
amounted to settlement of the English and Dutch and French on 
specific islands and locations on the mainland, whether sanctioned 
or not by their respective govemments. In addition to the defen­
sive role in patrolling the coasts, this squadron was also required 
to escort the treasure fleets in the crossing from Veracruz to 
Ha vana, seeking thereby to prevent the unf ortunate loss to pira tes 
or the enemy of the valuable cargoes, as occurred notably in 
1628 when the Dutch mariner Piet Heyn caputred the New 
Spain treasure fleet (3). 
1.2. Funding and composition 
Thus from 1636 the Spanish Crown designated funds, via a 
2 96 levy on the Mexican Merchands Guild ( Consulado), f or the 
creation and maintenance of a permanent squadron, based in 
Veracruz, and periodic stopovers in Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, 
and Havana according to strategic needs at any particular time. 
(3) This was the fleet under Juan de Benevides y Bazán, weakened through
having suffered losses in a storm on leaving Veracruz. For the attack of Heyn 
see HARING, [2], 296-298. The next major loss of the New Spain fleet was in 1702 
when the fleet under Manuel Velasco, on return to Vigo, was caught by the 
English and Dutch - yet even then the treasure was saved by sending it inland. 
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In f act the Armada de Barlovento was seen as the American 
counterpart to the Armada del Mar Océano in Spain, whose 
purpose was to def end the coasts of Spain and escort the fleets 
on departure and retum to the peninsula. But from the very 
beginning, this flotilla was conceived of as being esentially Mexi­
can, certainly in its deployment and its financing, since the Crown, 
whose coff ers were constantly depleted, insisted on it being 
funded from whithin that viceroyalty. Thus in 1637 the viceroy 
Marqués de Cadeyrete sent to Spain the sum of 400.000 pesos 
collected from the 2 96 surcharge f or the building of the ships 
which were to make up the new squadron. 
The difficult course of the Armada de Barlovento was sig­
nalled early on, because shortly afterwards the Consejo de Indias 
was complaining of the inappropriate use made of the funds 
received from New Spain: Your Majesty made use of those funds 
for other urgent purposes ( 4). Later the Crown instructed the 
viceroy to finance from the Mexican viceroyalty exhequer the 
building of ships in Havana and Santo Domingo, without specify­
ing from which specific account these costs were to come. 
The funding f or new ships did not come to fruition, and the 
squadron which finally appeared at the end of the 1630s was a 
makeshift flotilla composed of units from the Carrera de Indias 
and the Armada del Mar Océano, so unsatisfactory that the K.ing 
in March 1640 was complaining of the weakness of its capitana 
and almiranta which were appointed out of dire necessity the 
lack of really suitable vessels. At the same time the King was 
urging the viceroy to seek means to strengthen the newly created 
squadron (5). 
2. FIRST DEPLOYMENT 1636-1647
In the early 1640s the need f or the Armada de Barlovento
became very apparent when the Dutch occupied Curacao and 
(4) AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 2557, Junta de Guerra de Indias to King,
25/ag./1637. The same document refers to a contract made in 1636 with admira} 
Francisco Díaz Pimienta for the building of six �alleons in Havana, not realised 
because the Crown failed to pay of its debts to th1s official. 
(5) AGI, Indiferente General 2557, K.ing to Marqués de Cadyrete, 19/jan/164O.
This document also complains of the poor condition of the galleons about to sail 
for Veracruz under general José Centeno. For further detaíls of dates of depar­
tures, high fleet commands, see Guillermo CÉSPEDES DE CASILLO, La avería en el
comercio de Indias, Sevilla 1945, although this work does not distinguish between 
flee and Armada de Barlovento. 
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other islands in the Caribbean, while the English and French 
were about to make major settlements in the area. In 1640 
discussions were held to ref orrn Barlovento by using units from 
the fleet ( Galeones) about to lea ve f or Peru that year ( 6 ). Indeed 
Barlovento was refonned in this way, headed by a new gallean 
of 650 tons, the Porciúncula, built in Cantabria. This squadron 
sailed to the Indies but retumed to Spain in 1642 because the 
viceroy had refused to finance its masting and rigging. In January 
of that year the Consejo de Indias complained that it was un­
aware of the whereabouts of this flotilla, guessing that it was 
either on its way to Spain or stopping over in Havana (7). In 
1643 a galleon of Barlovento was lost off Cape Saint Vincent and 
in 1644 the r:iew 650 ton capitana, now appointed as capitana f or 
the New Spain fleet of that year, was substituted by a 550 ton 
vessel from the Armada del Mar Océano (8). At the same time, 
the Mexican Consulado, whose members funded Barlovento, ex­
pressed its anguish at the deterioration of this flotilla and the 
fact that one of its vessels, the 250 ton galleon San José had a 
rotting hull (9). In november 1643 a bitter dispute broke out in 
Cadiz because admiral Antonio de Isasi, in charge of the Armada 
del Mar Océano, ref used to o bey an order of the Casa de la 
Contratación to hand over two galleons to make up the Armada 
de Barlovento ( 1 O). 
Nevertheless Barlovento was reformed again by the spring of 
1644, consisting of six merchantmen (ureas) anda totalling 2.500 
tons. It sailed out with the Veracruz fleet in July of that year. In 
the Spring of 1645 the fleet general, Martín Carlos de Meneos, 
requested escorting by Barlovento ali the way back to Spain, a 
request resisted by the viceroy who insisted on the def ensive 
nature of the squadron and its main role in patrolling the New 
Spain and Caribbean waters. In the event, Martin Carlos de 
(6) AGI, Indiferente General 2557, Indies to King, 17 /jan/ 1640. These gal­
leons were really pat of the Armada for Cartagna in the Spring of 1640, which 
split off at Puerto Rico to pickup the tresure in Veracruz, since the capitana and 
almirantaof the Mexican fleet were judged to be too weak to bring back the 
treasure that year. 
(7) AGI, Indiferente General, Indias to King, 30/jan/ 1642.
(8) AGI, Indiferente General 2557, Junta de Guerra de Indias, to King,
19/sept/1643. 
(9) AGI, Indiferente General 2557, Indias to King, 23 / sept/ 1643 and
5/oct/1643. In these documents the Consejo de Indias blames the failure to 
strengthen Barlovento on the resistance of the Junta de Armadas to hand over 
the necessary vessels. 
(10) AGI, Indiferente General 2557, Indias to King, 16/nov/1643. The excuses
of Isasi, rejected by the Consejo de Indias, were based on equivalenl tonnages. 
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Meneos prevailed, and the flotilla returned with the fleet to 
Spain in 1645, departing again for Veracruz in 1646 after the Ca­
sa de la Contratación negotiated loans at 12 96 f or its careenage 
in Cadiz (11). Again, the fleet general Juan de Urbina insisted on 
the return of Barlovento to Spain in 1647. 
2.1. Features of the first deployment 
This first phase of the deployment of the Armada de Barlo­
vento, which had lasted a mere ten years and had been extremely 
contentious between the authorities in Spain and those in the 
colonies, ended with its dispersal arnong the resources of the 
Armada del Mar Océano and the Carrera de Indias. The positive 
aspect of this phase was the harmony between the high command 
of Barlovento and that of the New Spain fleet, even when their 
departures from Cadiz and Veracruz coincided. This harmony 
was unusual in an era when personal rivalry and bickering at 
high command level and below was the was the norm, contrasting 
with the quarrelsome nature of realtions between fleet com­
manders and royal authorities ashore. It appears that the regula­
tions were successf ul in laying down a hierarchy whereby the 
Barlovento commanders held supreme rank in the Veracruz­
Havana route, but deferrred to fleet commanders in the transa­
tlantic crossings. No doubt mutual resentment of port authorities 
served as a common bond betwen commanders of Barlovento 
and those of the fleet proper. 
lt is obvious already in this first phase that there was a clear 
diff erence between the vessels of Barlovento and the galleons of 
the Carrera de Indias. Essentially the vessels of the Carrera, 
albeit armed, were merchantmen designed to carry the largest 
merchant cargo possible in accordance with their tonnage. Even 
the two warships that headed the fleet, capitana and almiranta, 
almost always appointed from units of the Armada del Mar 
Océano, carried important merchant cargo, namely silver, mer­
cury, iron, tools and equipment, as well as personnel and pas­
sengers. Barlovento on the other hand has a purely naval func­
tion, with no commercial role, so much so that the regulations 
strictly forbade this flotilla, albeit in vain, to transport merchan-
( 11) AGI, In<lif eren te General 2557, Indias to King, 27 / dez/ 1645. These loans
were to be paid off from the King's treasure from Veracruz or from the silver of 
the galleons due to return from Cartagena. 
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clise or carry out trade of any kind. This prohibiton involved 
problems of cost, since unlike the Carrera, Barlovento could not 
be funded through freight licenses and depended on the viceregal 
funding through the 2 96 levy as well as on loans raised in Cadiz 
and Seville by the Casa de la Contratación. In f act the 2 96 levy 
continued to be raised, even in years when Barlovento was 
dispersed, and was used by the Crown f or whatever purposes it 
thought fit, and particularly f or contracts to build new galleo ns 
in Spain, although these contracts were rarely realised. In 1647, 
f or example, 12.000 ducats of the Barlovento f und were assigned 
to the construction of galleons in San Sebastian for the Armada 
del Mar Océano ( 12). 
In Cadiz, .the authorities reluctantly tolerated the unwelcome 
arrival of this squadron in the winter months, secquestrating its 
vessels and equipment for the campaigns in Europe - thus in 
1643 two vessles of Barlovento were assigned to the Duke of 
Ciudad Real f or an expedition to Tangiers, and la ter in 1666 five 
Barlovento vessels were transferred to the Armada Real (13). It 
was normal that these units, or the armament and rigging be­
longing to them, were not retumed in time f or the summer 
sailing to Mexico, so that when it retumed to Veracruz the 
Barlovento armada was even more poorly equipped than when it 
had sailed from the Indies to Spain. 
Another way in which the Spanish authorities compensated 
f or the inconvenience of having to look after the Armada de 
Barlovento when it arrived in Cadiz was to use its capitana to 
transport to Mexico products on behalf of the King, contravening 
the regulation that Barlovento whould not carry merchandise. 
This was imposed by the permanent situation of the lack of 
suitable vessels to serve as capitana and almiranta of fleets. So 
the tonnage provided by Barlovento was utilised to transport 
mercury, in one of two ways; either the Barlovento vessels were 
used to transport amounts of mercury left over from the main 
fleet, thus relieving the capitana and almiranta of the fleet which 
were always overloaded, as occurred f or example in 1646 on the 
fleet of Juan de Urbina, or the capitana of Barlovento was made 
to serve as capitana f or the whole fleet, taking the principal 
mercury cargo, as was the case in the fleet of Carlos Martín de 
Meneos in 1644 when the supply of mercury was particularly 
critica! - it was necessary to send that year an amount represen-
(12) GARCÍA FUENTES, [2], 189.
( 13) AGI, Indiferente General 2557, Indias to Casa de la Contratación,
19/9/1643. 
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ing two years production in Almadén plus a last minute supply 
obtained from the Austrian mines of Idria (14). 
3. DISPERSAL 1646-1663
In 1646 general Juan de Urbina, having retumed with his 
fleet to Spain, pressed f or an in crease in the Barlovento flotilla 
to eight galleons and a total of 3.000 tons. In 1648 the Consejo de 
Indias reported that the cost of despatching Barlovento from 
Spain in 1644 and 1646 amounted to 432.530 pesos, raised via 
loans f rom the Consulado of Seville. So far the Crown had 
managed to pay off only half of this debt, while the volume of 
interest accrued. This lack of f unds prevented the despatch of 
Barlovento with the fleet in June of that year (1648). A further 
obstacle to the deployment of Barlovento on this occasion, and a 
shackle on its previous eff ectiveness, was the bitter opposition to 
it of the Cadiz customs who viewed it as a front f or contraband 
trade, an attitude based on a good measure of reality. 
A further deterent to the ref ormation of Barlovento was the 
incapacity of the Peruvian and Mexican fleets to rendez-vous as 
foreseen in Havana every Spring, the dates being upset by delays 
and suspension of individual fleets; in f act in the second half of 
the xvrrth century, the goal of the joint departure from Havana 
was achieved in barely 30 96 of cases. For this reason the author­
ities resorted to the use of the Armada de Barlovento to escort 
the retuming Mexican fleet out of Havana and across the Atlantic 
back to Spain, where it wintered and returned to Veracruz with 
the f ollowing year' s fleet. These crossings to Spain left the Carib­
bean coasts def enceless, much to the irritation of the Mexican 
Merchants Guild ( Consulado) which continued to supply the funds 
f or the maintenance of the Barlovento flotilla. Moreover, due to 
the constant penury of the Crown, both in Spain and in the 
Indies, the Armada de Barlovento became a financial embarass­
ment both f or the viceroys in Mexico, responsible for the cost of 
its maintenance in Veracruz and the Casa de Contratación in 
Seville, responsible for its maintenance during its stays in Cadiz. 
This gave rise to the bitter disputes between Mexico and Spain 
as to who was ultimately responsable for costs. Thus while the 
( 14) This was the last batch of mercury obtained from Idria via the contract
with Antonio Balbi. See M. F. LANG, El monopolio estatal del mecurio en el 
México colonial, Fondo de Cultura, Mexico 1977, 124-125. 
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authorities in Seville accused the viceroys of seeking excuses to 
send Barlovento to Spain in order to offload its costs in Veracruz, 
the Mexican authorities on the other hand felt agrieved at having 
to finance a squadron which was absent from the Indies during 
half the year, leaving the Caribbean exposed to pirate and enemy 
activity. 
These problems were very apparent during the first phase of 
deployment in the 1640s and where to plague Barlovento during 
the remander of its precarious existence. It is not surprising that 
Veitia Linaje states categorically that the disintegration of Barlo­
vento in the period 1646-048 gave rise to a huge increase in 
piracy in the Caribbean ( 15). 
In 1653 a new atempt was made to ref orm this flotilla, to be 
based in Puerto Rico, but again financial problems arose. After 
the capture of Jamaica by the English in 1655, the authorities in 
Madrid discussed the possibility of a flotilla of f ourteen galleo ns, 
on condition that it was never to cross the Atlantic (16). 
4. BARLOVENTO REFORMED 1663-16 70
It was not until 1665 however that Barlovento once again
materialised, as a result of the capture of Campeche in 1663 by 
Manseault and Guiana by the English in 1664. In 1663 the Casa 
de la Contatación, advised by generals Juan de Urbina and Pablo 
Fernández de Contreras, had drawn up a report listing the ports 
and defenses of the Caribbean mainland, emphasising their weak 
points, and urging the ref ormation of Barlovento composed of 8-
1 O 200 ton galleons. The report pointed out that the cost of the 
new squadron, covered in any case by the 2 96 levy which had 
continued to be applied, would be offset by the saving in not 
having to strengthen weak coastal defences. It was also pointed 
out that the cost would be modest bearing in mind that Barlo­
vento would patrol a coastline five times longer than that coast 
of Spain itself ( 17). 
In the event the new Barlovento squadron was composed of 
six Dutch galleons under the command of the Basque mariner 
Agustín Dióstegui who financed their purchase in return for his 
( 15) VEITIA LINAJE, [ 1 ]. lib., 11, cap. v, no. 4.
(16) AGI, Indiferente General 2517, Pedro de Medrano to Marqués de Mance­
ra, 15 / avril/ 1664. 
( 17) VEITIA LINAJE, [ 1 ], lib., II, cap. v, no. 5.
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appointment as general, with Alonso de Campos as admiral. This 
flotilla was to be more active than the l 640s Barlovento in 
suppresing piracy, illegal trade, and ali enemy activity. lt was to 
be based in Puerto Rico and to extend its sphere of action to the 
south in an atttempt to restrain piracy along the coasts of Nueva 
Granada and Panamá. The cost of maintenance was calculated 
at 500.000 pesos per year ( 18). From this date on, the Armada de 
Barlovento played an intermittent role in navegation between 
Spain and the Indies until the naval reforms of 1708 ( 19). 
The concept of the ref onned flotilla was that Barlovento 
would be in V eracruz in the Spring, in time f or escorting the 
treasure fleet to La Habana. There, both fleets would join up 
with the galleo ns from Cartagena, and would lea ve together as 
far as the Bahamas Canal. There Barlovento would detatch itself, 
and proceed during the autumn and winter to patrol the islands 
and coasts, with stopovers at its Puerto Rico base. However, the 
concept of the Puerto Rico base was quickly abandoned, once 
again giving pref eren ce to Veracruz. This plan of action, together 
with others elaborated by the Consejo de Indias in the second 
half of the XVIIth century, in fact was followed only sporadically. 
Let us now consider the deployment of the new squadron in 
1665, whose total tonnage reached 1.950. lts Dutch components 
assembled in Santander in the autmn of 1664. In 1665 general 
Dióstegui was ordered to proceed to Corunna to join the Flanders 
squadron on its way to the Azores to escort back into Cadiz the 
mercury ships ( azogues) from Veracruz under the command of 
Francisco Martínez de Granada (20). 
Having completed this mission, Dióstegui's squadron was des­
patched to Valencia to pick up troops based in Aragón and 
transport them to Cadiz f or the campaign against Portugal. How­
ever this order was subsequently cancelled and Barlovento was 
now integrated to the Armada del Mar Océano until the autumn 
of 1666, patrolling the Atlantic coast of Spain. Thus two and a 
half years after its creation, the flotilla of Dióstegui had still not 
crossed the Atlantic let alone accomplished its principal mission 
of escorting the treasure out of Veracruz and operating against 
Caribbean piracy. This is the period referred to by Veitia Linaje 
( 18) Idem, lib 11, cap. v, no. 6.
( 19) For an account of these reforms, basically financia!, see E. PÉREZ­
MAILLANA BUENO, Política naval española en el Atlántico, Seville 1982, págs. 325-
329. 
(20) AGI, Indiferente General 1792, King to Franciso Martínez de Granada,
14 /avril/ 1664. 
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when he speaks of the clamour from the Indies for it (i.e. the 
Armada de Barlovento) (21 ). 
Meanwhile, in March 1665, the Casa de la Contratación in 
Seville had rejected the proposal to use part of Dióstegui's squad­
ron to make up the Mexican fleet, describing its vessels as f eeble 
merchantmen ( ureas desestimadas) totally inappropriate for trans­
porting the treasure and the mercury (22). 
In 1667, the Casa de la Contratación encountered great diffi­
culties in dispatching the Mexican fleet because of the late retum 
of the 1666 fleet under the Conde de Villalcázar. At the same 
time the vice ro y was clamouring f or an emergency supply of 
mercury f or the mines. The solution was to make use of Dióste­
gui' s squadron, however inadequate his vessels were. Yet by this 
time the Armada de Barlovento was in a pitiful state, none of its 
vessels having been careened during the three years they had 
served in the Armada del Mar Océano. Thus it had practically to 
be reformed anew, under the previous capitana and almiranta 
and adding two new 200 ton galleons, one built in Spain (thereby 
contravening the old regulation that Andalusian built ships were 
excluded from the Atlantic crossing). The mercury was loaded 
on the capitana San Felipe and on the almiranta La Concepción, 
and the other ships of the squadron were ordered to detach 
themselves of Puerto Rico to proceed against the pirates. Al­
though this squadron attempted to depart f rom San Lúcar in 
June 1667, it was frustrated by the notrious bar and did not 
depart until July 19th with a cargo of 2.618 quintals of mer­
cury (23). 
On anival in Veracruz, Dióstegui requested 355.545 pesos of 
the 500.000 assigned, but was given only 100.00 thereby unleash­
ing the usual squabbles over the costs of the wintering in New 
Spain. In these circumstances Dióstegui decided to bring f orward 
his departure to February 1668 and to return to Spain for provi­
sions and careenage. With the treasure on board, Dióstegui 
reached Havana in March 1668 and from there despatched the 
almiranta and other galleons under admira! Alonso Campos to 
patrol the southern Caribbean. The general returned with his 
(21) VEITIA LINAJE, f 1 ], lib., II, cap. v, no. 9. In this section Veitia Linaje
krelates in detail the unfortunate circumstances of the loss of Barlovento udner 
admiral Alonso Campos. 
(22) AGI, Indiferente General 2600, Contratación to Indias, 13/march/ 1665.
(23) AGI, Indiferente General 2613, Indias to Reina Gobernadora,
15/may / 1675. 
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capitana to Spain in January 1669, integrated to the retuming 
Mexican fleet of Gas par de Argandona (24 ). 
Meanwhile, the Consejo de Indias had been counting on the 
availability of the Armada de Barlovento to escort out of Vera­
cruz the fleet of Enrique Enriquez Guzmán, due to set sail for 
Havana in the Spring of 1669. Since by that date Dióstegui was 
already back in Spain, Enriquez Guzmán decided to delay his 
departure from Veracruz until Barlovento retumed to the Indies. 
He waited in vain, received no information about the wherea­
bouts of Barlovento, and in late August 1669 set sail unescorted. 
All these circumstances reflect the great uncertainty and unrelia­
bility of the Barlovento squadron when it was required, either to 
accompany the treasure or to act against piracy, and demonstrate 
the eff ect of this uncertainty on the logistics of fleet despatch. 
Meanwhile the detachment under admiral Alonso Campos, 
weakened by the absence of the capitana under Dióstegui, was 
caught by surprised and destroyed off Marcabibo by the Dutch 
in the summer of 1668. Campos himself survived this disaster, 
but was arrested and sent in chains to Spain by the viceroy 
Marqués de Mancera on the fleet of Gaspar de Argandona in 
1669. In short, the only positive result of the reformation of the 
Armada de Barlovento in 1665 was the saf e delivery of the 
mere u y to New Spain in 166 7 and the transport of the treasure 
to Spain in 1669 (25). The disastrous f ailure of this squadron on 
its reappearance in regard to its action against piracy once again 
led to its dispersa} in 1669-70. 
5. REFORMATION AND DEPLOYMENT 1676-1738
Subsequently various proposals were received in Madrid by 
Basque mariners proposing to organise a squadron from Corunna 
or Vigo to act against piracy in the Caribbean, in return for 
licenses to trade. Although these proposals were seriously consi­
dered in the Council of the Indies, they were finally rejected 
since it was feared that these sailings would have a negative 
eff ect on the commercial sucess of the annual fleets, would be 
(24) AGI, Indiferente General 2601, Contratación to Indias, 7/1/1670 and
TORRES [2], pág. 88. 
(25) AGI, Indiferente General 2601, Instructions to Enrique Enriquez Guzmán,
March 1668. 
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detrimental to the Andalusian trade monopoly, and would ob­
struct the efficient collection of export and import duties (26 ). 
Given the disembering of Barlovento, the decade of 16 70 was 
a peak era in piracy, with the capture by Morgan of Portobelo 
and another sacking of Campeche. In reply, the Armada de 
Barlovento was refonned in 1676, made up of galleons from the 
Carrera de Indias. Nevertheless this time it consisted only of 
capitana and almiranta, which sailed out to Veracruz but without 
the other galleons promised. Later this nucleus was increased to 
five vessels, ali financed theoretically by the Mexican levy. As 
always, the viceroy was obliged to divert these funds to other 
urgencies of govemment, undermining the maintenance and per­
manency of this squadron. In the late 16 70s Barlovento was 
engaged in lacklustre patrols around the islands of the Caribbean, 
with long stays in port awaiting supplies, rigging, and finance. As 
usual, the final destiny of the squadron was to cross the Atlantic 
to Spain and be integrated to the Armada del Mar Océano (27). 
In 1681 it is again identified as a separate squadron, this time 
used to substitute galleo ns unavailable f or making up the regular 
fleet. When the fleet of 1680 under Gaspar de Velasco was 
detained in Veracruz, thé' Armada de Barlovento was fitted out 
in Spain under the command of Juan Pereda de Salcedo for the 
purpose of transporting 1.500 quintals of Almadén mercury ur­
gently needed by the Mexican silver mines. The instructions to 
Juan Pereda included the task of subsequently clearing the coasts 
of pirates. The departure of this squadron from Spain, pro­
grammed for February 1681 was frustrated by an outbreak of 
epidemia in Cadiz, so that exceptionally the sailing was transf erred 
to the nearby Puerto Real. There is no clear indication of the 
progress of this flotilla after reaching Veracruz in May 1681, and 
it is to be supposed that after the usual patrols through the 
Caribbean it was integrated to the returning fleet of Diego de 
Zaldívar in 1683. Once again the most positive aspect of the 
deployment of Barlovento was the saf e delivery of the mercury 
cargo (28). In 1685 Barlovento was active clearing the Caribbean 
(26) For details of the proposals of the Basque mariners see F. SERRANO
MANGAS, Los galeones en la Carrera de Indias 1650-1700, Sevilla 1985. págs. 120-
132. On various occasions towards the end of the XVIIth century die King
threatened to authorise Basque commerce with America in order to intimidate
the Seville Merchants Guild.
(27) J. RIVERA GAMBAS, Los gobernantes de México, Mexico, Porrúa, 1872,
pág. 651. 
(28) AGI, Contratación 4324, no. 2, 226 (libros de carga y dato), and AGN,
19, 15, 149, Conde de Paredes to King, 24.12.1682. 
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coasts after the sacking of Campeche, a deployment which de­
layed the retum to Spain of the mercury ships under Martín 
García Suárez which had to await the return of the Mexican 
flotilla to its Veracruz base (29). 
In this period the gaol seems to have at least partically 
achieved of retaining Barlovento in the Indies without retuming 
to Spain, although its effictiveness was minimal. In 1687 the 
Mexican fleet under José Femandez de Santillana which sailed 
from Cadiz at the end of June carried equipment and rigging to 
restore the Barlovento galleons languishing in Veracruz (30). 
In 1688 the costs of maintaining Barlovento amounted to 
484.659 pesos, matching the 5.000.000 of the annual f unding (31 ). 
At the beginning of the l 690s Barlovento spent most of its time 
docked in Ha vana, sin ce it was f eared that the openness of the 
port of Veracruz exposed it to greater wear and tear (32). In 
1691 the Casa de la Contratación urged the need to improve the 
perf ormnance of this flotilla, recommending an off er by the 
Sevillian mariner Francisco Garrote to build a galleon in Havana 
at his own cost, 54 varas long and 18 wide, to strengthen the 
Barlovento squadron (33). In July 1692, the Armada de Barlovento 
escorted the fleet out of Veracruz, commanded by the Conde de 
San Remi, arriving in Havana on August 11th. Thre it was learned 
that a French fleet of 131 vessels was lying in wait off the 
Azores. On Septem ber 9th, while escorting the returning fleet to 
the Bahamas Canal, Barlovento lost its capitana and other gal­
leons in a stom. The rump of the squadron escorted the fleet to 
Cadiz, sailing out again in July 1693 (34). 
At the end of 1697, under general Andrés de Pez and admira} 
Guillermo Morfi, Barlovento encountered a French squadron off 
(29) Barlovento on this occasion was under the command of Antonio de
Asturia, financed with 50.000 pesos borrowed from funds of the Havana fort 
(presidio). AGI, Mexico 354, royal officials of Veracruz to Indias, 12/avril/1686. 
(30) These two galleons were for making up the losses of Barlovento in
Veracruz. AGI, Indiferente General 2605, Indias to King, 7 /july / 1687. 
(31) This expense, in the accoutns of the fleet which returned to Spain in
December 1688, was exceeded only by that of the fortresses (presidios) of the 
viceroyalty (= 714.647 pesos), AGI, Indiferente General 2605, Indias to King, 
3/jan/1689. 
(32) RIVERA (27], 651.
(33) The Casa de la Contratación was strongly in favour of this offer.
Garrote asked in return for a license to sdend his galleon San Bernardo with the 
1691 fleet, to be scuppered in Veracruz. AGI, Indiferente General 2583, Contrata­
ción to King, 9/jan/1691. 
(34) AGI, Indiferente General 2584, Conde de San Remi to Consejo de
Indias, 4/ dez/ l 693. 
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the coast of Santo Domingo, leading to the loss of its almiranta 
and the dispersa! of its other components. Subsequently general 
and admira! were brought to justice in Spain, but Andrés de Pez 
was later reinstated to head the important 1708 fleet (35). 
During the 1690s and the decade of 1700-171 O, f our f actors 
combined to obstruct the despatch of fleets to the Indies. The 
War of the spanish Succession, the continued activity of pirates, 
the weakness of the American market f or Euro pean products, 
and the constant lack of all kinds of galleo ns suitable f or the 
Atlantic crossing. Thus the Casa de la Contratación had to resort 
to ad hoc solutions to ensure the indispensable supply of mercury 
and the transport back to Spain of the treasure. One solution 
was to use lhpited small scale despatches - the so called mercury 
galleons ( azogues) whose principal cargo was the mercury on 
leaving Spain and the treasure on the return. The other was the 
use of the resources of the Armada de Barlovento to make up 
the lack of regular fleet. Thus, during these two decades there is 
ref erence to the use of Barlovento to transport the mercury 
although it is not always clear whether it was functionaing as an 
autonomous unit or integrated on an ad hoc basis to full or 
partial fleets ( medias flotas). At the same time, Barlovento was 
retained f or longer periods in the Indies. 
In 1701 general Femando Chacón headed mercury ships with 
8.000 quintals of mercury f or Veracruz and on return was es­
corted with the treasure by the Armada de Barlovento under 
Andrés de Ariola. On the outward voyage the capitana of fleet, 
San Juan Bautista, carried 220 rolls of can vas f or Barlovento 
rigging. After unloading the mercury, the almiranta Santa Maria 
de Tezanos was lost in a storm off Veracruz and the vessels of 
the Armada de Barlovento were called into service to assist in 
the salvage operations (36 ). 
In 1702, the viceroy Duke of Albuquerque complained of the 
deterioration of the Barlovento squadron, emphasising especially 
the chaotic state of its accounts, the corruption of its officers, 
the illegal trade in which its crews were involved, and above all 
its incapacity to sail out of port, remaining in harbour without 
setting sail, as usually occurs, for most of the time the goals for 
(35) In fact Andrés de Pez headed this fleet as general of the Armada de
Barlovento. This was the first flet to sail under the new regulations. See PÉREZ­
MAILLANA [ 19], págs. 11-12. 
(36) AGI, Indiferente General 2731, viceroy to King, 13/avril/1702 and AGI,
Indiferente General 2731, Indias to King 19/jul/1701. 
R. l., 1994, nQ 202
(c) Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas. 
Licencia Creative Commons Reconocimiento 4.0  
Internacional (CC BY 4.0)
http://revistadeindias.revistas.csic.es
THE ARMADA DE BARLOVENTO, FLEET DESPATCH TO MEXICO 1637-1738 589 
which it was founded are unrealised (37). In 1703, on the occasion 
of an urgent supply of mercury sent under admira! Francisco 
Garrote, the King instructed the viceroy Albuquerque to fit out 
Barlovento to escort Garrote on departure from Veracruz in the 
autumn of that year, first as far as Havana, and then to the 
Bahamas Canal. Garrote was to def er to the Barlovento command 
during this first phase of his retum voyage. Barlovento was to 
detatch itself after escorting Garrote and sail to Puerto Rico, 
Santa Marta, Cartagena, and the coast of Venezuela to deliver 
f unds f or the pay of troppos in the coas tal f ortresses, pick up 
equipment for Mexico and return to Veracruz. When Garrote 
left Veracruz eventually in January 1704 he gas escorted by 
Barlovento, composed of six galleons. However, strong winds 
from the north dispersed the Barlovento galleons, detatching 
them from the main flotilla, and when the admira} reached 
Havana he was escorted by only one vessel, the Barlovento 
almiranta. Later, giving testimony in Cadiz, Garrote expressed 
disgust at the nautical competnece of his Barlovento escort (38). 
Hence throughout this period Barlovento continued to be 
deployed, but in a sporadic faction, with a mínimum of effective­
ness, with its crew and equipment diverted ad hoc to other uses. 
However it functioned seldom as an autonomous unit, serving as 
an escort or being integrated into the convoys or partial fleets. 
Its role in transporting or saf eguarding the transport of mercury 
was in f act its greatest achievement. In 1706, 1708, and 1711, one 
again Barlovewnto was deployed to transport the essential ingre­
dient of the silver mining refining process (patio). 
lts role in the subsequent decades of the xvm th century was 
f eebler still, beca use from 1708 the fleet system was rationalised 
and ref ormed while pira e y diminished and greater toleran ce was 
shown in the acceptance of foreign intrusion. The mercury supply 
was entrusted increasingly to the azogue galleons, now established 
as a regular system. The decreasing importance of Barlovento 
ended in its suppression in 1738 when a royal decree described it 
as a monster in expense and a micky mouse ( hormiga) in its 
effectiveness (39). 
(37) AGI, Indiferente General 2737, viceroy to King, 15/may / 1702. The vice­
roy complained moreovcr of the frauds committed by the generals of Barlovento 
with regard to provisions during their stays in the port. 
(38) AGI, Indiferente General 2733, Francisco Garrote to King, 22/avril/ 1704.
(39) TORRES [2], pág. 212.
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Summing up, it is evident that in the polital and naval history 
of the Spanish Empire, the Armada de Barlovento is usually 
dismissed as a f eeble and ineffictive flotilla. Of course it f ailed in 
its principal objective of suppressing piracy and enemy incursions 
in the Caribbena, and it was strikingly prone to losses through 
strom and attack. At the same time there has been a tendency to 
think of it a a permanent fixed entity, a subsidiary of the Carrera 
de Indias and the Armada del Mar Océano, the Caribbean cosun­
terpart of the Armada del Mar del Sur which served the coast of 
Perú. In f act, although in theory it was conceived of as such, in 
practice it was essentially an expeditionary force, always impro­
vised according to the urgencies of the moment. Moreover it is 
clear from the details of the individual deployments described 
above, that although it was initially conceived of as a Mexican 
flotilla, in practice it was important in the Atlantic crossing in 
general, and sailed as often out of Cadiz as out of Veracruz. In 
its f avour it may be pointed out that however unsatisf actory its 
deployment may have been, languishing as it did in port through 
lack of finan ce, in f act no New Spain treasure fleet was lost to 
piracy or the enemy after its foundation and that the occasional 
losses of fleet galleons were due rather to storms. It may well be 
that awareness of its very existence and the mystery surrounding 
its whereabouts and deployment at any one time acted as a 
deterrant restraining possible attacks on the treasure fleets, and 
limiting pirate sucesses to the coastal settlements. If this is taken 
into consideration together with its valueable role in delivering 
mercury at critical times, and in safely escorting the treasure 
fleet to Havana, and frequently across the Atlantic back to Spain 
as well then it has to be recognised that this flotilla was not as 
useless as is sometimes thought, and indeed that its deployment 
was relatively acceptable bearing in mind that the Crown con­
stantly deprived it of funds. Further, it is apparent from the 
details of the deployment of Barlovento in the years of its active 
existence that the theoretical division of naval forces between 
Carrera de Indias, Armada del Mar Océano, Armada de Barlo­
vento, and other squadrons, was a purely artificial one, since 
vessels and equipment were constantly interchanged between ali 
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these flotillas. Finally, it must be empasised again that the idea of 
Barlovento as a purely American flotilla is not borne out be the 
f acts, that in judging its performance its Euro pean and Atlantic 
performance must be taken into consideration, and that in the 
last analysis the only purely Hispanic American squadron was 
the Armada del Mar del Sur which was deployed along the 
Pacific coast of South America. 
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